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Abstract
Dependency analysis is a program analysis that determines
potential data flow between program points. While it is not a
security analysis per se, it is a viable basis for investigating
data integrity, for ensuring confidentiality, and for guaran-
teeing sanitization. A noninterference property can be stated
and proved for the dependency analysis.
We have designed and implemented a dependency analy-
sis for JavaScript. We formalize this analysis as an abstrac-
tion of a tainting semantics. We prove the correctness of the
tainting semantics, the soundness of the abstraction, a non-
interference property, and the termination of the analysis.
Categories and Subject Descriptors F.3.2 [LOGICS AND
MEANINGS OF PROGRAMS]: Semantics of Program-
ming Languages—Program analysis; D.3.1 [PROGRAM-
MING LANGUAGES ]: Formal Definitions and Theory—
Semantics ; D.4.6 [OPERATING SYSTEMS]: Security and
Protection—Information flow controls
General Terms Security
Keywords Type-based Analysis, Dependency, JavaScript
1. Introduction
Security Engineering is one of the challenges of modern
software development. The connected world we live in con-
sists of interacting entities that process distributed private
data. This data has to be protected against illegal usage, tam-
pering, and theft.
Web applications are one popular example of such inter-
acting entities. They run in the web browser and consist of
program fragments from different sources (e.g., mashups).
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Such fragments should not be entrusted with sensitive infor-
mation. However, if a fragment’s input data can be shown
not to depend on confidential data, then it cannot divulge
this data or tamper with it.
A Web application may also be vulnerable to an injection
attack. Such an attack arises when data is stored in a database
or in the DOM without proper escaping. If an analysis can
determine that the input to the database never depends di-
rectly on a data source (like an HTML input field), but rather
is always filtered by a suitable sanitizer, then many kinds of
injection attacks can be avoided.
Dependency analysis is a program analysis that can help
in both situations, because it determines potential data flow
between program points. Intuitively, there is a dependency
between the value in variable x and the value of an expres-
sion e[x] containing the variable if substituting different ex-
pressions e′ for x may change the value of e[e′]. In our ap-
plication we label data sources (e.g., as confidential) in a
JavaScript program and are interested in identifying the po-
tential sinks reachable from these data sources. For saniti-
zation, we instrument sanitizers with a relabeling operation
that modifies the dependency on the original data source to a
sanitized dependency. We consider a data sink safe, if it only
depends on data that passed through a sanitizer. Other uses
of dependency information for optimization or paralleliza-
tion are possible, but not considered in this work.
We designed and implemented our dependency anal-
ysis as an extension of TAJS [15], a type analyzer for
JavaScript. The implementation allows us to label data
sources with a traceℓ marker and to indicate relabelings
with an untrace(A→֒A
′) marker. The analysis performs an
abstract interpretation to approximate the flow of the mark-
ers throughout the program. The marker is part of the ana-
lyzed type and propagated to all program points that depend
on a marked value.
Part of our work consists in establishing the formal un-
derpinnings of the implemented analysis. Thus, we outline
a correctness proof for the dependency part of the analysis.
For conducting the proofs, we have simplified the domains
with respect to the implementation to avoid an overly com-
plex formal system. To this end, we formalize the dynamic
semantics of a JavaScript core language, extend that with
marker propagation, and then formalize the abstract inter-
pretation of this extended semantics. Both, concrete and ab-
stract semantics are given as big-step semantics. We prove
sound marker propagation, sound approximation of the dy-
namic semantics by its abstract counterpart, noninterference,
and the termination of the analysis.
Contributions
• Design and implementation of a type-based dependency
analysis based on TAJS [15].
• Formalization of the analysis.
• Proofs of correctness and termination.
• Extension of the analysis for sanitization (Section 7).
• A noninterference theorem (Section 8).
Overview Section 2 considers some example scenarios of
our implemented system. Section 3 formalizes a core lan-
guage, its dynamic semantics, and defines noninterference
semantically. Section 4 extends this semantics with tainting.
Section 5 defines the corresponding abstraction, Section 6
gives some example applications, and Section 7 defines the
extension for sanitization. Section 8 contains our theorems
of soundness, noninterference, and termination. Section 9
briefly describes the implementation. Related work is dis-
cussed in Section 10 followed by a conclusion.
The proofs of soundness, noninterference, and termina-
tion are shown in appendix A, B, C, and D.
2. Application Scenario
Web developers rely on third-party libraries for calendars,
maps, social networks, and so on. To create a trustworthy
application, they should ensure that these libraries do not
leak sensitive information of their users.
One way to avoid such leaks is to detect information flow
from confidential data sources to untrusted sinks by program
analysis and take measures to avoid this flow. Sometimes,
this approach is too restrictive, because the data arriving
at the sink has been sanitized on the way from the source.
Sanitization can take many forms: data may have been en-
crypted or a username/password combination may have been
reduced to a boolean. In such cases, the resulting data still
depends on the confidential source, but it can be safely de-
classified and passed on to an untrusted sink.
An analogous scenario is the avoidance of injection at-
tacks where direct dependencies of database queries or
DOM contents from input fields in a Web form should be
avoided. However, an indirect dependency via a sanitizer
that, in this case, escapes the values suitably is acceptable.
Our dependency analysis addresses both scenarios as il-
lustrated with the following examples.
1 var u s e r H a n d l e r = f u n c t i o n ( u i d ) {
2 var u s e r D a t a = {name : ’ ’} ;
3 var onSucces s = f u n c t i o n ( r e s p o n s e ) {
4 u s e r D a t a = r e s p o n s e ;
5 } ;
6
7 i f ( Cookie . i s s e t ( u i d ) ) {
8 Cookie . r e q u e s t ( uid , onSucces s ) ;
9 } e l s e {
10 Ajax . r e q u e s t ( ’ h t t p :\\ example . org ’ , {
11 c o n t e n t : u i d
12 } , onSucces s ) ;
13 }
14
15 re turn {
16 getName : f u n c t i o n ( ) {
17 re turn u s e r D a t a . name ;
18 }
19 }
20 } ;
21 var name1 = u s e r H a n d l e r ( t r a c e ( ” u id1 ” ) ) . getName ( ) ;
22 var name2 = u s e r H a n d l e r ( t r a c e ( ” u id2 ” ) ) . getName ( ) ;
Figure 1. Loading sensitive data.
2.1 Cookies
A web developer might want to ensure that the code does not
read sensitive data from cookies and sends it to the net. Tech-
nically, it means that data that is passed to network send op-
erations must not depend on document.cookie. This dependency
can be checked by our analysis.
To label data sources, our implementation reads a config-
uration file with a list of JavaScript objects that are labeled
with a dependency mark before starting the analysis. Any
predefined value or function can be marked in this way. For
this example, the analyzer is to label document.cookie with t0.
Values that are written to a cookie are labeled by wrap-
ping them in a trace expression. The analysis determines that
values returned from cookies are influenced by document.cookie.
Furthermore, after writing a marked value to a cookie, each
subsequent read operation returns a value that depends on it.
The following code snippet uses a standard library for
reading and writing cookies. The comments show the ana-
lyzed dependencies of the respective values.
1 var v a l 1 = readCook ie ( ’ t e s t ’ ) ; // d(val1)={t0}
2 var v a l 2 = t r a c e ( 4 7 1 1 ) ; // d(val2)={t1}
3 w r i t e C o o k i e ( ’ t e s t ’ , v a l 2 ) ;
4 var v a l 3 = readCook ie ( ’ t e s t ’ ) ; // d(val3)={t0,t1}
Thus, the read value in val1 is influenced by document.cookie.
The value in val2 is labeled by a fresh mark t1. Later, this
value is written to the cookie. Hence, the result val3 of the
last read operation is influenced by document.cookie and val2.
2.2 Application: Sensitive Data
The next example is to illustrate the underpinnings of our
analysis and to point out differences to other techniques.
Figure 1 shows a code fragment to request the user name
corresponding to a user id. This data is either read from a
cookie or obtained by an Ajax request.
The function userHandler returns an interface to a user’s
personal data. The implementation abstracts from the data
source by using a callback function onSuccess to handle the
1 l oadFore ignC od e = t r a c e ( f u n c t i o n ( ) {
2 Array . p r o t o t y p e . f o r e a c h = f u n c t i o n ( c a l l b a c k ) {
3 f o r ( var k = 0 ; k < t h i s . l e n g t h ; k ++) {
4 c a l l b a c k ( k , t h i s [ k ] ) ;
5 }
6 } ;
7 } ) ;
8 l oadFore ignC od e ( ) ;
9 // [..]
10 var a r r a y = new Array (4711 , 4 7 1 2 ) ;
11 a r r a y . f o r e a c h ( f u n c t i o n ( k , v ) {
12 r e s u l t = k + v ;
13 } ) ;
Figure 2. Using foreign Code.
results. The code ignores the problem that userData may not be
valid before completion of the Ajax request.
To detect all values depending on user information, a
developer would mark the id. This mark should propagate to
values returned from Cookie. request () and Ajax. request () . Because
we are interested in values depending on Cookie. request () and
Ajax. request () the interfaces also get marked.
The conditional in line 7 depends on Cookie. isset (uid) and
thus on uid and on the cookie interface. The value in userData
(line 4) depends on uid, on the cookie interface, and on
Cookie. isset (uid) from the Ajax interface. The result name1 de-
pends on userData .name and therefore on the user id, the cookie
interface, and potentially on the Ajax interface.
Standard security analyses label values with marks drawn
from a security lattice, often just Low and High. If both
sources, the cookie interface and the Ajax interface, are
labeled with the same mark, there is no way to distinguish
these sources. Dependencies allow us a to formulate security
properties on a fine level of granularity that distinguishes
different sources without changing the underlying lattice.
Second, our analysis is flow-sensitive. Dependencies are
bound to values instead of variable names or parameters. A
variable may containt different values depending on differ-
ent sources during evaluation. In addition, the underlying
TAJS implementation already handles aliasing and polyvari-
ant analysis in a satisfactory way.
In the example, the values in name1 and name2 result from
the same function but may depend on different sources.
The flow-sensitive model retains the independence of the
value in name1 and trace (”uid2”). Section 6.1 discusses the actual
outcome of the analysis.
2.3 Application: Foreign Code
The second scenario (Figure 2) illustrates one way a library
can extend existing functionality. This example extends the
prototype of Array by a foreach function. Later on, this function
is used to iterate over elements.
The goal here is to protect code from being compromised
by the libraries used. The function loadForeignCode encapsulates
foreign code and is labeled as a source. In consequence, all
values created or modified by calling loadForeignCode depend
on this function and contain its mark. Because the function
1 $ = f u n c t i o n ( i d ) {
2 re turn t r a c e ( document . ge tE lemen tById ( i d ) . va lue , ”#DOM” ) ;
3 }
4 f u n c t i o n s a n i t i z e r ( v a l u e ) {
5 /∗ c l e a n up v a l u e . . . ∗ /
6 re turn untrace ( va lue , ”#DOM” ) ;
7 }
8 // [...]
9 var i n p u t = $ ( ” t e x t ” ) ;
10 var s e c u r e I n p u t = s a n i t i z e r ( i n p u t ) ;
11 consumer ( s e c u r e I n p u t ) ;
Figure 3. Analyzing sanitization.
in the foreach property gets marked, the values in result also
get marked. Therefore, result may be influenced by loading
foreign code. See Section 6.2 for the results of the analysis.
2.4 Application: Sanitization
Noninterference is not the only interesting property that can
be investigated with the dependency analyzer. To avoid in-
jection attacks, programmers should ensure that only es-
caped values occur in a database query or become part of
an HTML page. Also, a dependency on a secret data source
may be acceptable if the data is encrypted before being pub-
lished. These examples illustrate the general idea of sanitiza-
tion where a suitable function needs to be interposed in the
dataflow between certain sources and sinks.
The concrete example in Figure 3 applies our analysis to
the problem. The input is labeled with mark #DOM (line 2).
The function in line 4 performs some (unspecified) sanitiza-
tion and finally applies the untrace function to mark the de-
pendency on the marks identified with #DOM as a sanitized,
safe dependency. The argument of the consumer can now
be checked for dependencies on unsanitized values. In the
example code, the analysis determines that the argument de-
pends on the DOM, but that the dependency is sanitized.
Changing line 10 as indicated below leaves the argument
of the consumer with a mixture of sanitized and unsanitized
dependencies. This mixture could be flagged as an error.
var s e c u r e I n p u t =
i k n o w w h a t i d o ? s a n i t i z e r ( i n p u t ) : i n p u t ;
3. Formalization
This section presents the JavaScript core calculus λJ along
with a semantic definition of independence.
3.1 Syntax of λJ
λJ is inspired by JavaScript core calculi from the literature
[11, 14]. A λJ expression (Figure 4) is either a constant c (a
boolean, a number, a string, undefined, or null), a variable
x, a lambda expression, an application, a primitive operation,
a conditional, an object creation, a property reference, a
property assignment, or a trace expression.
The trace expression is novel to our calculus. It creates
marked values that can be tracked by our dependency analy-
sis. The expression newℓ e creates an object whose prototype
e ::= c | x | λℓx.e | e(e) | op(e, e)
| if (e) e, e | newℓ e | e[e] | e[e] = e | traceℓ(e)
Location ∋ ξℓ
Value ∋ v ::= c | ξℓ
Prototype ∋ p ::= v
Closure ∋ f ::= ∅ | 〈ρ, λℓx.e〉
Object ∋ o ::= ∅ | o[str 7→ v]
Storable ∋ s ::= 〈o, f, p〉
Environment ∋ ρ ::= ∅ | ρ[x 7→ v]
Heap ∋ H ::= ∅ | H[ξℓ 7→ s]
Figure 4. Syntax and semantic domains of λJ .
〈o, f, p〉(str) ::=


v, o = o′[str → v]
o′(str), o = o′[str′ → v]
H(ξℓ)(str), o = ∅ ∧ p = ξℓ
undefined, o = ∅ ∧ p = c
〈o, f, p〉[str 7→ v] ::= 〈o[str 7→ v], f, p〉
〈o, f, p〉f ::= f
H[ξℓ, str 7→ v] ::= H[ξℓ 7→ H(ξℓ)[str 7→ v]]
H[ξℓ 7→ ∅] ::= H[ξℓ 7→ 〈∅, ∅, null〉]
H[ξℓ 7→ o] ::= H[ξℓ 7→ 〈o, ∅, null〉]
H[ξℓ 7→ f ] ::= H[ξℓ 7→ 〈∅, f, null〉]
H[ξℓ 7→ p] ::= H[ξℓ 7→ 〈∅, ∅, p〉]
Figure 5. Abbreviations.
is the result of e. The lambda expression, the new expression,
and the trace expression carry a unique mark ℓ.
3.2 Semantic domains
Figure 4 also defines the semantic domains of λJ . A heap
maps a location ξℓ to a storable s, which is a triple consist-
ing of an object o, potentially a function closure f (only for
function objects), and a value p, which serves as the pro-
totype. The superscript ℓ refers the expression causing the
allocation. An object o maps a string to a value. A closure
consists of an environment ρ and an expression e. The envi-
ronment ρ maps a variable to a value v, which may be a base
type constant or a location.
Program execution is modeled by a big-step evaluation
judgment of the form H, ρ ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | v. The evaluation
of expression e in an initial heap H and environment ρ
results in the final heap H′ and the value v. We omit its
standard definition for space reasons, but show excerpts of
an augmented semantics in Section 4.
Figure 5 introduces some abbreviated notation. A prop-
erty lookup or a property update on a storable s = 〈o, f, p〉 is
relayed to the underlying object. The property access s(str)
returns undefined by default if the accessed string is not de-
fined in o and the prototype of s is not a location ξℓ. We write
sf for the closure in s. The notationH[ξℓ, str 7→ v] updates a
property of storable H(ξℓ), H[ξℓ 7→ o] initializes an object,
and H[ξℓ 7→ f ] defines a function.
3.3 Independence
The traceℓ expression serves to mark a program point as a
source of sensitive data. An expression e is independent from
that source if the value of the traceℓ expression does not
influence the final result of e. The first definition formalizes
replacing the argument of a traceℓ expression.
Definition 1. The substitution e[ℓ 7→ e˜] of ℓ in e by e˜ is
defined as the homomorphic extension of
traceℓ(e′)[ℓ 7→ e˜] ≡ traceℓ(e˜) (1)
Definition 2 (incomplete first attempt). The expression e
is independent from ℓ iff all possible substitutions of ℓ are
unobservable.
∀e1, e2 : H, ρ ⊢ e[ℓ 7→ e1] ⇓ H1 | v
↔ H, ρ ⊢ e[ℓ 7→ e2] ⇓ H2 | v
(2)
This definition covers both, the terminating and the non-
terminating cases. Furthermore, we consider direct depen-
dencies, indirect dependencies, and transitive dependencies,
similar to the behavior described by Denning [8, 9]. In Sec-
tion 8, we complete this definition to make it amenable to
proof.
4. Dependency Tracking Semantics
To attach marker propagation for upcoming values we apply
definition 2 to the λJ calculus. The later on derived abstract
interpretation is formalized on this extended calculus.
This section extends the semantics of λJ with mark prop-
agation. The resulting calculus λDJ only provides a baseline
calculus for subsequent static analysis. λDJ is specifically not
meant to perform any kind of dynamic analysis, where the
presence or absence of a mark in a value guarantees some
dependency related property.
The calculus extends Value to Tainted Value ∋ ω ::=
v : κ where κ ::= ∅ | ℓ | κ • κ is a dependency annotation.
Tainted Value replaces Value in objects and environments.
The operation • joins two dependencies. If ω = v : κv then
write ω • κ for v : κv • κ to apply a dependency annotation
to a value.
The big-step evaluation judgmentH, ρ, κ ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | ω
for λDJ extends the one for λJ by a new component κ which
tracks the context dependency for expression e. Figure 6
contains its defining inference rules.
The evaluation rules (DT-CONST), (DT-VAR), and (DT-
ABS) are trivial. Their return values depend on the context.
(DT-OP) calculates the result on the value part and com-
bines the dependencies of the involved values. ⇓vop stands for
the application of operator op. The rule (DT-NEW) binds the
(DT-CONST)
H, ρ, κ ⊢ c ⇓ H | c : κ
(DT-VAR)
H, ρ, κ ⊢ x ⇓ H | ρ(x) • κ
(DT-ABS)
ξℓ /∈ dom(H)
H, ρ, κ ⊢ λℓx.e ⇓ H[ξℓ 7→ 〈ρ, λℓx.e〉] | ξℓ : κ
(DT-OP)
H, ρ, κ ⊢ e0 ⇓ H
′ | v0 : κ0
H′, ρ, κ ⊢ e1 ⇓ H
′′ | v1 : κ1
vop = ⇓
v
op (v0, v1)
H, ρ, κ ⊢ op(e0, e1) ⇓ H′′ | vop : κ0 • κ1
(DT-NEW)
H, ρ, κ ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | v : κv ξ
ℓ /∈ dom(H)
H, ρ, κ ⊢ newℓ e ⇓ H′[ξℓ 7→ v] | ξℓ : κv
(DT-APP)
H, ρ, κ ⊢ e0 ⇓ H
′ | ξℓ : κ0
〈o, 〈ρ˙, λℓx.e〉, p〉 = H′(ξℓ)
H′, ρ, κ ⊢ e1 ⇓ H
′′ | v1 : κ1
H′′, ρ˙[x 7→ v1 : κ1], κ • κ0 ⊢ e ⇓ H
′′′ | v : κv
H, ρ, κ ⊢ e0(e1) ⇓ H
′′′ | v : κv
(DT-IFTRUE)
H, ρ, κ ⊢ e0 ⇓ H
′ | v0 : κ0
v0 = true H
′, ρ, κ • κ0 ⊢ e1 ⇓ H
′′
1 | v1 : κ1
H, ρ, κ ⊢ if (e0) e1, e2 ⇓ H′′1 | v1 : κ1
(DT-IFFALSE)
H, ρ, κ ⊢ e0 ⇓ H
′ | v0 : κ0
v0 6= true H
′, ρ, κ • κ0 ⊢ e2 ⇓ H
′′
2 | v2 : κ2
H, ρ, κ ⊢ if (e0) e1, e2 ⇓ H′′2 | v2 : κ2
(DT-GET)
H, ρ, κ ⊢ e0 ⇓ H
′ | ξℓ : κξℓ
H′, ρ, κ ⊢ e1 ⇓ H
′′ | str : κstr
H, ρ, κ ⊢ e0[e1] ⇓ H
′′ | H′′(ξℓ)(str) • κξℓ • κstr
(DT-PUT)
H, ρ, κ ⊢ e0 ⇓ H
′ | ξℓ : κξℓ
H′, ρ, κ ⊢ e1 ⇓ H
′′ | str : κstr
H′′, ρ, κ ⊢ e2 ⇓ H
′′′ | v : κv
H′′′′ = H′′′[ξℓ, str 7→ v : κv • κξℓ • κstr]
H, ρ, κ ⊢ e0[e1] = e2 ⇓ H
′′′′ | v : κv
(DT-TRACE)
H, ρ, κ • ℓ ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | v : κv
H, ρ, κ ⊢ traceℓ (e) ⇓ H′ | v : κv
Figure 6. Inference rules of λDJ .
Undefined ::= ℘({undefined})
Null ::= ℘({null})
Bool ::= ℘({true, false})
Num ::= NUM⊤⊥
String ::= STRING⊤⊥
Lattice Value ∋ L ::= Undefined × Null ×
Bool × Num × String
Figure 7. Base Type Value Lattice.
Label ∋ Ξ ::= {ℓ . . . }
Abstract Closure ∋ Λℓ ::= 〈σ, λℓx.e〉
Abstract Object ∋ ∆ ::= ∅ |∆[L 7→ ϑ]
Abstract Value ∋ ϑ ::= 〈L,Ξ,D〉
Abstract Storable ∋ θ ::= 〈∆,Λℓ,Ξ〉
FunctionStore ∋ F ::= ∅ | F [ℓ 7→ 〈Γ, ϑ,Γ, ϑ〉]
Scope ∋ σ ::= ∅ | σ[x 7→ ϑ]
ObjectStore ∋ Σ ::= ∅ | Σ[ℓ 7→ θ]
State ∋ Γ ::= 〈Σ,D〉
Dependency ∋ D ::= ∅ | ℓ | D ⊔ D
Figure 8. Abstract Semantic Domains.
dependency of the evaluated prototype to the returned loca-
tion. During (DT-APP) the dependency of the value refer-
encing the function is bound to the sub-context. In a similar
way (DT-IFTRUE) and (DT-IFFALSE) bind the dependency
of the condition to the sub-context. The rule (DT-GET) com-
bines the dependencies of heap location and property ref-
erence to the returned value. The rule (DT-PUT) combines
these dependencies to the assigned value because the evalu-
ated location and property references affect the write opera-
tion and further the value which is accessible at this location.
The trace expression traceℓ (e) (DT-TRACE) adds the
ℓ annotation to the context of expression e. This addition
causes all values created or modified in e to be marked with ℓ
(e.g. to detect side effects) as stated by the following context
dependency lemma.
Lemma 1. H, ρ, κ ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | v : κv implies that κ ⊆ κv.
The proof is by induction on the relation ⇓ (Section A).
5. Abstract Analysis
The analysis is an abstraction of the λDJ calculus. Its basis
is the lattice for base type values (Figure 7), which is a
simplified adaptation of the lattice of TAJS [15]. NUM is
the set of floating point numbers, STRING the set of string
literals, and the annotation ·⊤⊥ turns a set into a flat lattice by
adding a bottom and top element. An element of the analysis
lattice is a tuple like 〈⊥,⊥, true,⊥, ”x”〉 which represents
a value which is either the boolean value true or the string
”x”. Further, 〈⊥,⊥,⊥,⊤,⊥〉 represents all possible number
values. The abstract semantic domains (Figure 8) are similar
to the domains arising from the λDJ calculus except that a
set of marks Ξ abstracts a set of concrete locations ξℓ where
ℓ ∈ Ξ. An abstract value ϑ = 〈L,Ξ,D〉 is a triple of a
lattice element L, object marks Ξ, and dependencyD.
Hence, each abstract value represents a set of base type
values and a set of objects. We write Lϑ for the analysis lat-
tice, Ξϑ for the marks, and Dϑ for the dependency compo-
nent of the abstract value ϑ. Each abstract object is identified
by the mark ℓ corresponding to the newℓ e expression cre-
ating the object. An abstract storable consists of an abstract
object, a function closure, and a set of locations representing
the prototype. Unlike before, the abstract object maps a lat-
tice element to a value. This mechanism reduces the number
of merge operations during the abstract analysis.
The abstract state is a pair Γ = 〈Σ,D〉 where Σ is the
mapping from marks to abstract storables. We write ΣΓ for
the object store, and DΓ for the dependency in Γ. Γ(Ξ)
provides a set of storables, denoted by Θ. The substitution
of D in Γ written Γ[D 7→ D′] ≡ 〈ΣΓ,D′〉 replaces the state
dependency.
To handle recursive function calls we introduce a global
function store F , which maps a mark ℓ to two pairs of state
Γ and value ϑ. Functions are also identified by marks ℓ. The
function store contains the merged result of the last evalu-
ation for each function. The first pair ΓIn, ϑIn represents
the input state and input parameter of all heretofore taken
function calls, the second one ΓOut, ϑOut the output state
and return value. For further use we write F(ℓ)In to se-
lect the input, and F(ℓ)Out for the output. The substitutions
F [ℓ, In 7→ 〈Γ, ϑ〉] andF [ℓ, Out 7→ 〈Γ, ϑ〉] denotes the store
update operation on input or output pairs.
Its inference is stated by the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Function Store). ∀F ,Λℓ,Γ, ϑ : If 〈Γ, ϑ〉 ⊑
F(ℓ)In andΛℓ = 〈σ˙, λℓx.e〉 thenΓ, σ˙[x 7→ ϑ] ⊢ e ⇓ Γ′ | ϑ′
and 〈Γ′, ϑ′〉 ⊑ F(ℓ)Out.
The proof is by induction on the derivation of Γ′′[D 7→
DΓ′′ ⊔ D0] ⊢ΘAPP Γ
′′(Ξ0), ϑ1 ⇓ Γ′′′ | ϑ.
The traceℓ expression registers the dependency from ℓ on
all values that pass through it.
The abstraction is defined as relation between v ∈
Tainted Value and ϑ ∈ Abstract Value.
Definition 3 (Abstraction). The abstractionα : Tainted Value
→ Abstract Value is defined as:
α(v : κ) ::=
{
〈⊥, {ℓ}, {ℓ|ℓ ∈ κ}〉 v = ξℓ
〈c, ∅, {ℓ|ℓ ∈ κ}〉 v = c
(3)
Definition 4 (Abstract Operation). The abstract operation
⇓ϑop is defined in terms of the concrete operation ⇓vop as
(A-PROGRAM)
Γ⊥, σ⊥ ⊢ e ⇓ Γ | ϑ
⊢R,QP 〈F⊥,Γ⊥, ϑ⊥〉, 〈F ,Γ, ϑ〉, e ⇓ Γ
′ | ϑ′
⊢ e ⇓ Γ′ | ϑ′
(P-ITERATION-NOTEQUALS)
Γ⊥, σ⊥ ⊢ e ⇓ Γ
′ | ϑ′
⊢R,QP R
′, 〈F ,Γ′, ϑ′〉, e ⇓ Q
⊢R,QP R,R
′, e ⇓ Q
(P-ITERATION-EQUALS)
⊢R,QP R,R, e ⇓ R
Figure 9. Inference rules for program interpretation.
(APP-ITERATION)
Γ ⊢Λ
ℓ
APP Λ
ℓ, ϑ ⇓ Γ′ | ϑ′
Γ′ ⊢ΘAPP Θ, ϑ ⇓ Γ
′′ | ϑ′′
Γ ⊢ΘAPP 〈∆,Λ
ℓ,Ξ〉; Θ, ϑ ⇓ Γ′′ | ϑ′ ⊔ ϑ′′
(APP-ITERATION-EMPTY)
Γ ⊢ΘAPP ∅, ϑ ⇓ Γ | ϑ⊥
(APP-STORE-SUBSET)
〈Γ, ϑ〉 ⊑ F(ℓ)In 〈Γ
′, ϑ′〉 = F(ℓ)Out
Γ ⊢Λ
ℓ
APP Λ
ℓ, ϑ ⇓ Γ′ | ϑ′
(APP-STORE-NONSUBSET)
〈Γ, ϑ〉 6⊑ F(ℓ)In 〈σ˙, λ
ℓx.e〉 = Λℓ
〈Γ¯, ϑ¯〉 = F(ℓ)In ⊔ 〈Γ, ϑ〉 F [ℓ, In 7→ 〈Γ¯, ϑ¯〉]
Γ¯, σ˙[x 7→ ϑ¯] ⊢ e ⇓ Γ¯′ | ϑ¯′ F [ℓ, Out 7→ 〈Γ¯′, ϑ¯′〉]
Γ ⊢Λ
ℓ
APP Λ
ℓ, ϑ ⇓ Γ¯′ | ϑ¯′
Figure 11. Inference rules for function application.
usual:
⇓ϑop (ϑ0, ϑ1) ::=⊔
{⇓vop (v0, v1) | v0 ∈ ϑ0, v1 ∈ ϑ1}
(4)
This definition implies that:
⇓vop (v0, v1) = vop →
⇓ϑop (α(v0), α(v1)) ⊒ α(vop)
(5)
Figures 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 show the inference rules for
the big-step evaluation judgment of the abstract semantics.
It has the form Γ, σ ⊢ e ⇓ Γ′ | ϑ. State Γ and scope σ
analyze expression e and result in state Γ′ and value ϑ. We
use notations similar to Figure 5.
The global program rule (A-PROGRAM) (Figure 9) relies
on two auxiliary rules to repeatedly evaluate the program
until the analysis state, an element of Analysis Lattice con-
sisting of F , Γ and ϑ, becomes stable. In the figure, R,Q
(A-CONST)
Γ, σ ⊢ c ⇓ Γ | 〈c, ∅,DΓ〉
(A-VAR)
Γ, σ ⊢ x ⇓ Γ | σ(x) ⊔DΓ
(A-OP)
Γ, σ ⊢ e0 ⇓ Γ
′ | ϑ0
Γ′, σ ⊢ e1 ⇓ Γ
′′ | ϑ1
〈L,Ξ〉 =⇓ϑop (ϑ0, ϑ1)
Γ, σ ⊢ op(e0, e1) ⇓ Γ′′ | 〈L,Ξ,Dϑ0 ⊔ Dϑ1〉
(A-NEW-NONEXISTING)
ℓ /∈ dom(Γ) Γ, σ ⊢ e ⇓ Γ′ | 〈L,Ξ,D〉
Γ, σ ⊢ newℓ e ⇓ Γ′[ℓ 7→ Ξ] | 〈L⊥, {ℓ},DΓ ⊔D〉
(A-NEW-EXISTING)
ℓ ∈ dom(Γ) Γ, σ ⊢ e ⇓ Γ′ | 〈L,Ξ,D〉
Γ, σ ⊢ newℓ e ⇓ Γ′[ℓ 7→ Γ(ℓ) ⊔ 〈∅,Λℓ⊥,Ξ〉] | 〈L⊥, {ℓ},DΓ ⊔ D〉
(A-ABS-NONEXISTING)
ℓ /∈ dom(Γ) F [ℓ 7→ 〈Γ⊥, ϑ⊥,Γ⊥, ϑ⊥〉]
Γ, σ ⊢ λℓx.e ⇓ Γ[ℓ 7→ 〈σ, λℓx.e〉] | 〈L⊥, {ℓ},DΓ〉
(A-ABS-EXISTING)
ℓ ∈ dom(Γ) 〈σ˙, λℓx.e〉 = Γ(ℓ)Λℓ
Γ, σ ⊢ λℓx.e ⇓ Γ[ℓ 7→ 〈σ ⊔ σ˙, λℓx.e〉] | 〈L⊥, {ℓ},DΓ〉
(A-APP)
Γ, σ ⊢ e0 ⇓ Γ
′ | 〈L0,Ξ0,D0〉
Γ′, σ ⊢ e1 ⇓ Γ
′′ | ϑ1
Γ′′[D 7→ DΓ′′ ⊔ D0] ⊢
Θ
APP Γ
′′(Ξ0), ϑ1 ⇓ Γ
′′′ | ϑ
Γ, σ ⊢ e0(e1) ⇓ 〈ΣΓ′′′ ,DΓ〉 | ϑ
(A-GET)
Γ, σ ⊢ e0 ⇓ Γ
′ | 〈L0,Ξ0,D0〉
Γ′, σ ⊢ e1 ⇓ Γ
′′ | 〈str,Ξ1,D1〉
Γ′′ ⊢ΘGET Γ
′′(Ξ0), str ⇓ ϑ
Γ, σ ⊢ e0[e1] ⇓ Γ
′′ | 〈Lϑ,Ξϑ,D0 ⊔ D1 ⊔ Dϑ〉
(A-PUT)
Γ, σ ⊢ e0 ⇓ Γ
′ | 〈L0,Ξ0,D0〉
Γ′, σ ⊢ e1 ⇓ Γ
′′ | 〈str,Ξ1,D1〉
Γ′′, σ ⊢ e2 ⇓ Γ
′′′ | ϑ
Γ′′′ ⊢ΞPUT Ξ0, str, 〈Lϑ,Ξϑ,D0 ⊔ D1 ⊔ Dϑ〉 ⇓ Γ
′′′′
Γ, σ ⊢ e0[e1] = e2 ⇓ Γ
′′′′ | ϑ
(A-IFTRUE)
Γ, σ ⊢ e0 ⇓ Γ
′ | 〈L0,Ξ0,D0〉
L0 = true Γ
′[D 7→ DΓ′ ⊔D0], σ ⊢ e1 ⇓ Γ
′′ | ϑ1
Γ, σ ⊢ if (e0) e1, e2 ⇓ 〈ΣΓ′′ ,DΓ〉 | ϑ1
(A-IFFALSE)
Γ, σ ⊢ e0 ⇓ Γ
′ | 〈L0,Ξ0,D0〉
L0 = false Γ
′[D 7→ DΓ′ ⊔ D0], σ ⊢ e2 ⇓ Γ
′′ | ϑ2
Γ, σ ⊢ if (e0) e1, e2 ⇓ 〈ΣΓ′′ ,DΓ〉 | ϑ2
(A-IF)
Γ, σ ⊢ e0 ⇓ Γ
′ | 〈L0,Ξ0,D0〉
L0 6= true ∧ L0 6= false
Γ′[D 7→ DΓ′ ⊔D0], σ ⊢ e1 ⇓ Γ
′′
1 | ϑ1
Γ′[D 7→ DΓ′ ⊔D0], σ ⊢ e2 ⇓ Γ
′′
2 | ϑ2
Γ, σ ⊢ if (e0) e1, e2 ⇓ 〈ΣΓ′′
1
⊔ ΣΓ′′
2
,DΓ〉 | ϑ1 ⊔ ϑ2
(A-TRACE)
Γ[D 7→ DΓ ⊔ ℓ], σ ⊢ e ⇓ Γ
′ | ϑ
Γ, σ ⊢ traceℓ (e) ⇓ 〈ΣΓ′ ,DΓ〉 | ϑ
Figure 10. Inference rules for abstract interpretation.
range over Analysis Lattice and write F⊥, Γ⊥ and σ⊥ for
the empty instances of the components.
In Figure 10, the rules for constants (A-CONST) and
variables (A-VAR) work similarly as in λDJ .
The object and function creation rules are also omitted.
They check if an object or function, referenced by ℓ, already
exists. In this case the object or function creation has to
merge the prototypes or scopes.
The rule (A-OP) is also standard. As in λDJ the traceℓ
expression (A-TRACE) assigns mark ℓ to the sub-state.
The rules for the conditional (A-IF), (A-IFTRUE), and (A-
IFFALSE) have to handle the case that it is not possible
to distinguish between true and false. In this case both
branches have to be evaluated and the results merged.
Similar problems arise in function application, property
reference, and property assignment. Each value can refer
to a set of objects including a set of prototypes. Therefore
each referenced function has to be evaluated (A-APP) and
a property has to be read from (A-GET) or written to (A-
PUT) all objects. Results have to be merged. The auxiliary
rules are shown in figure 11, 12, and 13.
The rules (APP-ITERATION) and (APP-ITERATION-
EMPTY) iterate over all referenced functions. Function ap-
plication relies on the function store F . Before evaluating
(GET-ITERATION)
Γ ⊢∆GET ∆,L ⇓ ϑ
Γ ⊢ΘGET Θ,L ⇓ ϑ
′
Γ ⊢ΘGET Γ(Ξ),L ⇓ ϑ
′′
Γ ⊢ΘGET 〈∆,Λ
ℓ,Ξ〉; Θ,L ⇓ ϑ ⊔ ϑ′ ⊔ ϑ′′
(GET-ITERATION-EMPTY)
Γ ⊢ΘGET ∅,L ⇓ ϑ⊥
(GET-INTERSECTION)
L ⊓ Li 6=⊥
Γ ⊢ΘGET ∆,L ⇓ ϑ
′
Γ ⊢∆GET (Li : ϑi);∆,L ⇓ ϑi ⊔ ϑ
′
(GET-NONINTERSECTION)
L ⊓ Li =⊥
Γ ⊢ΘGET ∆,L ⇓ ϑ
′
Γ ⊢∆GET (Li : ϑi);∆,L ⇓ ϑ
′
(GET-EMPTY)
Γ ⊢∆GET ∅,L ⇓ 〈〈⊤,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥〉, ∅, ∅〉
Figure 12. Inference rules for property reference.
(PUT-ITERATION)
Γ ⊢ℓPUT ℓ,L, ϑ ⇓ Γ
′
Γ′ ⊢ΞPUT Ξ,L, ϑ ⇓ Γ
′′
Γ ⊢ΞPUT ℓ; Ξ,L, ϑ ⇓ Γ
′′
(PUT-ITERATION-EMPTY)
Γ ⊢ΞPUT ∅,L, ϑ ⇓ Γ
(PUT-ASSIGNMENT-INDOM)
L ∈ dom(Γ(ℓ))
Γ ⊢ℓPUT ℓ,L, ϑ ⇓ Γ[ℓ,L 7→ Γ(ℓ)(L) ⊔ ϑ]
(PUT-ASSIGNMENT-NOTINDOM)
L /∈ dom(Γ(ℓ))
Γ ⊢ℓPUT ℓ,L, ϑ ⇓ Γ[ℓ,L 7→ ϑ]
Figure 13. Inference rules for property assignment.
the function body, the analyzer checks if the input, consist-
ing of Γ and parameter ϑ, is already subsumed by the stored
input. In that case (APP-STORE-SUBSET), the stored re-
sult, consisting of output state Γ and return value ϑ, is used.
Otherwise the function body is evaluated (APP-STORE-
NONSUBSET) and the store is updated with the result.
For read and write operations the rules (GET-ITERATION),
(GET-ITERATION-EMPTY), (PUT-ITERATION) and (PUT-
ITERATION-EMPTY) iterate in a similar way over all refer-
ences. An abstract object maps a lattice element to a value
in case a reference is not a singleton value. All entries hav-
ing an intersection with the reference are affected by the
read operation. The prototype-set has to be involved. (GET-
INTERSECTION), (GET-NONINTERSECTION) and (GET-
EMPTY) shows its inference. Before writing a property, the
analyser checks if the property already exists. In this case
(PUT-ASSIGNMENT-INDOM), the values get merged. Oth-
erwise (PUT-ASSIGNMENT-NOTINDOM) the value gets as-
signed. The actual implementation uses a more refined lat-
tice to improve precision.
The abstract interpretation over-approximates the depen-
dencies. The merging of results in (A-IF), (A-APP), (A-
GET), and (A-PUT) may cause false positives. While some
marked values may be independent from the mark’s source,
unmarked values are guaranteed to be independent.
6. Applying the Analysis
This section reconsiders the examples Sensitive Data (Sec-
tion 2.2) and Foreign Code (Section 2.3) from the introduc-
tion from an abstract analysis point of view.
6.1 Application: Sensitive Data
Given the newly created mark ℓ1, the function userHandler is
initially called with 〈〈⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥, uid1〉, ∅, ℓ1〉. If the result
of calling Cookie. isset can be determined to be false, then the
dependencies associated with false (ℓ1 and ℓc — resulting
from the cookie interface) are bound to the conditional’s
context.
The Ajax request cannot be evaluated. So, response in
onSuccess is a value containing the location of an unspecified
object like ∅[〈⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊤〉 7→ 〈〈⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊤〉, ∅, ℓa〉]
augmented with ℓa. In this case, all further calls to onSuccess
are already covered by the first input.
By calling the userHandler with ”uid2” a new mark ℓ2 is in-
troduced. This call is not covered by the first one so that the
function is reanalyzed with the merged value 〈〈⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥
, String〉, ∅, {ℓ1, ℓ2}〉. After the analysis has stabilized, name1
also depends on ℓ2.
The example illustrates that merging functions can result
in conservative results. The implementation has a more re-
fined function store which is indexed by a pair of scope σ
and source location ℓ to prevent such inaccuracies.
6.2 Application: Foreign Code
The trace expression in line 1 (Section2.3) marks the sub-
context for creating the foreach function. The resulting loca-
tion that points to the function is augmented with this mark.
By calling loadForeigenCode the mark is bound to the callees con-
text and finally to the value referencing the foreach function.
By iterating over the array elements (line 11) the depen-
dency annotation is forwarded to the value occurring in result .
Unlike many other security analyses, the objects Array
and Array. prototype do not receive marks. If the analysis can
determine the updated property exactly, as is the case with
e ::= . . . | traceℓ,A(e, c) | untrace(A→֒A
′)(e, c)
Figure 14. Extended syntax of λAJ .
(DT-TRACE-CLASSIFIED)
H, ρ, κ • ℓc ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | v : κv
H, ρ, κ ⊢ traceℓ,A (e, c) ⇓ H′ | v : κv
(DT-UNTRACE)
H, ρ, κ ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | v : κv κ
′ = κv[ℓ
A,c 7→ ℓA
′,c]
H, ρ, κ ⊢ untrace(A→֒A
′) (e, c) ⇓ H′ | v : κ′
Figure 15. Inference rules of λAJ .
(A-TRACE-CLASSIFIED)
Γ[D 7→ DΓ ⊔ ℓ
A,c], σ ⊢ e ⇓ Γ′ | ϑ
Γ, σ ⊢ traceℓ,A (e, c) ⇓ 〈ΣΓ′ ,DΓ〉 | ϑ
(A-UNTRACE)
Γ, σ ⊢ e ⇓ Γ′ | ϑ D′ϑ = Dϑ[ℓ
A,c 7→ ℓA
′,c]
Γ, σ ⊢ untrace(A→֒A
′) (e, c) ⇓ 〈ΣΓ′ ,DΓ〉 | 〈Lϑ,Ξϑ,D
′
ϑ〉
Figure 16. Inference rules for abstract trace.
foreach, then no other properties can be affected by the update
(expect the length). Such an abstract update occurs if the
property name is independent from the input. Otherwise, the
update happens on a approximated set of property names, all
of which are marked by this update.
6.3 Further sample applications
We also applied our analysis to real-world examples like the
JavaScript Cookie Library with jQuery bindings and JSON
support1 (version 2.2.0) and the Rye2 library (version 0.1.0),
a JavaScript library for DOM manipulation.
These libraries were augmented by wrapping several
functions and objects using the trace function. The analy-
sis successfully tracks the flow of the thus marked values,
which pop up in the expected places.
7. Dependency Classification
To cater for dependency classification, the accompanying
formal framework λAJ extends λDJ (Figure 14). In λAJ marks
are classified according to a finite set of modes. They are fur-
ther augmented by an identifier that can be referred to in the
1 http://code.google.com/p/cookies/
2 http://ryejs.com/
trace and untrace expressions. The operator traceℓ,A generates
a mark in modeA and the untrace operator changes the mode
of all ℓ-marks according to the sanitization method applied
(this distinction is ignored in the example). In the calculus,
this change is expressed by the untrace(A→֒A
′) expression,
whereA ranges over an unspecified set of modes.
Marks κ ::= . . . | ℓA,c are extended by an new mark-
type, a location classified with a class A and identifier c.
The mark propagation is like in Section 4 (see Figure 15).
Rule (DT-TRACE-CLASSIFIED) augments the sub-context
with the new classified mark. (DT-UNTRACE) substitutes
location ℓA,c by a declassified location ℓA′,c.
In the analysis, τ ::= ℓ | ℓA,c replaces ℓ in D. Rule (A-
TRACE-CLASSIFIED) (Figure 16) generates new dependen-
cies and (A-UNTRACE) substitutes A by A′ in all locations
ℓ labeled with c.
8. Technical Results
To prove the soundness of our abstract analysis we show
termination insensitive noninterference. The required steps
are proving noninterference for the λDJ calculus, showing
that the abstract analysis provides a correct abstraction of
the λDJ calculus, and that the abstract analysis terminates.
8.1 Noninterference
Proving noninterference requires relating different substitu-
tion instances of the same expression. As they may evaluate
differently, we need to be able to cater for differences in the
heap, for example, with respect to locations.
Definition 5. A renaming ♭ ::= ∅ | ♭[ξℓ 7→ ξℓ′] is a partial
mapping on locations where ♭(ξℓ) carries the same mark ℓ
as ξℓ.
It extends to values by ♭(c) = c.
In the upcoming definitions, the dependency annotation κ
contains the marks created by the selected traceℓ expression,
the body of which may be substituted.
Further, we introduce equivalence relations for each ele-
ment affected by the ℓ substitution.
Definition 6. Two marked values are ♭, κ-equivalent v0 :
κ0 ≡♭,κ v1 : κ1 if they are equal as long as their marks are
disjoint from κ.
κ ∩ κ0 = ∅ ∧ κ ∩ κ1 = ∅ ⇒ ♭(v0) = v1 (6)
Definition 7. Two environments ρ0,ρ1 are ♭, κ-equivalent
ρ0 ≡♭,κ ρ1 if R := dom(ρ0) = dom(ρ1) and they contain
equivalent values.
∀x ∈ R : ρ0(x) ≡♭,κ ρ1(x) (7)
Definition 8. Two expressions e0,e1 are ♭, κ-equivalent
e0 ≡♭,κ e1 iff they only differ in the argument of traceℓ(e′)
subexpressions with ℓ ∈ κ.
κ = {ℓ0, ..., ℓn} ⇒
∃e′0 . . . ∃e
′
n : e0 = e1[ℓ0 7→ e
′
0] . . . [ℓn 7→ e
′
n]
(8)
Definition 9. Two storables s0,s1 are ♭, κ-equivalent
〈o0, 〈ρ0, λℓx.e0〉, p0〉 ≡♭,κ 〈o1, 〈ρ1, λ
ℓx.e1〉, p1〉 if S :=
dom(o0) = dom(o1) and they only differ in values c : κc
with any intersection with κ.
∀str ∈ S : o0(str) ≡♭,κ o1(str) (9)
ρ0 ≡♭,κ ρ1 ∧ λ
ℓx.e0 ≡♭,κ λ
ℓx.e1 (10)
♭(p0) = p1 (11)
Definition 10. Two heapsH0,H1 are ♭, κ-equivalentH0 ≡♭,κ
H1 if they only differ in values x : κx with any intersection
with κ or in one-sided locations.
∀ξℓ ∈ dom(♭) : H0(ξ
ℓ) ≡♭,κ H1(♭(ξ
ℓ)) (12)
Now, the noninterference theorem can be stated as fol-
lows.
Theorem 1. Suppose H, ρ, κ ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | v : κv . If ℓ /∈ κ¯
and H ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} H˜ and ρ ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} ρ˜ then H˜, ρ˜, κ ⊢ e¯ ⇓
H˜′ | v˜ : κ˜v with e¯ = e[ℓ 7→ e˜] and e ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} e¯ and
H′ ≡♭′,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} H˜
′ and v : κv ≡♭′,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} v˜ : κ˜v , for some ♭′
extending ♭.
The proof is by induction on the evaluation ⇓ (Section B).
8.2 Correctness
The abstract analysis is a correct abstraction of the λDJ cal-
culus. To formalize correctness, we introduce a consistency
relation that relates semantic domains of the concrete depen-
dency tracking semantics of λDJ with the abstract domains.
Definition 11. The consistency relation ≺C is defined by:
κ ≺C D ⇔ κ ⊆ D
c ≺C L ⇔ c ∈ L
ξℓ ≺C Ξ ⇔ ℓ ∈ Ξ
v ≺C ϑ ⇔
{
ξℓ ≺C Ξϑ, v = ξℓ
c ≺C Lϑ, v = c
v : κ ≺C ϑ ⇔ κ ≺C Dϑ ∧ v ≺C ϑ
o ≺C ∆ ⇔ ∀str ∈ dom(o) : ∃L ∈ dom(∆) :
str ≺C L ∧ o(str) ≺C ∆(L) ∧
∀str /∈ dom(o) : undefined ≺C ∆(L)
ρ ≺C σ ⇔ ∀x ∈ dom(ρ) : x ∈ dom(σ)
∧ ρ(x) ≺C σ(x)
f ≺C Λℓ ⇔ 〈ρ, λℓx.ef 〉 = f ∧ 〈σ, λℓx.eΛℓ〉 = Λ
ℓ
→ ρ ≺C σ ∧ λℓx.ef = λℓx.eΛℓ
s ≺C θ ⇔ 〈o, f, p〉 = s ∧ 〈∆,Λℓ,Ξ〉 = θ
→ o ≺C ∆ ∧ f ≺C Λℓ ∧ p ≺C Ξ
H ≺C Γ ⇔ ∀ξ
ℓ ∈ dom(H) : ℓ ∈ ΣΓ
∧ H(ξℓ) ≺C ΣΓ(ℓ)
Showing adherence to the inference of λDJ requires to
proof that consistent heaps, environments, and values pro-
duce a consistent heap and value.
Lemma 3 (Program). ∀e : ∅, ∅, ∅ ⊢ e ⇓ H | ω and
⊢ e ⇓ Γ | ϑ implies that 〈H, ω〉 ≺C 〈Γ, ϑ〉
Given by theorem (2) and definition (11).
Lemma 4 (Property Reference). ∀H, ξℓ, str,Γ,Ξ,L :H ≺C
Γ, ξℓ ≺C Ξ, str ≺C L, and ⊢ΘGET Γ(Ξ),L ⇓ ϑ implies
H(ξℓ)(str) ≺C ϑ
The proof is by definition (11) and by induction on the
derivation of Γ′′ ⊢ΘGET Γ′′(Ξ0), str ⇓ ϑ.
Lemma 5 (Property Assignment). ∀H, ξℓ, str, ω,Γ,Ξ,L, ϑ :
H ≺C Γ, ξℓ ≺C Ξ, str ≺C L, ω ≺C ϑ and Γ ⊢ΞPUT
Ξ,L, ϑ ⇓ Γ′ implies H[ξℓ, str 7→ ω] ≺C Γ′
The proof is by definition (11) and by induction on
the derivation of Γ′′′ ⊢ΞPUT Ξ0, str, 〈Lϑ,Ξϑ,D0 ⊔ D1 ⊔
Dϑ〉 ⇓ Γ′′′′.
The following correctness theorem relates the concrete
semantics to the abstract semantics.
Theorem 2. Suppose thatH, ρ, κ ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | x then ∀Γ, σ
with H ≺C Γ, ρ ≺C σ and κ ≺C DΓ: Γ, σ ⊢ e ⇓ Γ′ | ϑ
with H′ ≺C Γ′ and x ≺C ϑ.
The proof is by induction on the evaluation of e (Section
C).
8.3 Termination
Finally, we want to guarantee termination of our analysis.
Theorem 3. For each Γ, σ, and e, there exist Γ′ and ϑ such
that Γ, σ ⊢ e ⇓ Γ′ | ϑ.
For the proof (Section D), we observe that all rules of the
abstract system in Section 5 are monotone with respect to all
their inputs. As the analysis lattice for Γ has finite height, all
fixpoint computations in the abstract semantics terminate.
9. Implementation
The implementation extends TAJS3, the type analyzer for
JavaScript. TAJS accepts standard JavaScript [14] .
The abstract interpretation of values and the analysis state
are extended by a set of dependency annotations, according
to the description in Section 5. As shown in Section 3.1 val-
ues can be marked by using the traceℓ expression, which
is implemented as a built-in function. A configuration file
can be used to trace values produced by JavaScript standard
operations or DOM functions. The DOM environment gets
constructed during the initialization of TAJS and is available
as as normal code would be. The functionality and the de-
pendency propagation for these operations is hard coded.
The extended dependency set has no influence on the
lattice structure and does not compromise the precision of
the type analyzer. Some notes about the precision can be
found in the original work of TAJS [15].
The functions traceℓ and untrace(A→֒A′) have to be de-
fined as identity functions before the instrumented code can
run in a standard JavaScript engine.
3 http://www.brics.dk/TAJS/
Benchmark TAJS TbDA
Richards (539 lines) 1596 2890
DeltaBlue (880 lines) 3471 4031
Crypto (1689 lines) 3637 7527
RegExp (4758 lines) 3710 4104
Splay (394 lines) 1598 2521
Navier Stokes (387 lines) 2794 3118
Figure 17. Google V8 Benchmark Suite.
TAJS handles all language features like prototypes, iter-
ations, and exceptions. The specification in Figure 10 sim-
plifies the implementation in several respects. To support the
conditional to properly account for indirect information flow,
the control flow graph had to be extended with special de-
pendency push and pop nodes to encapsulate sub-graphs and
to add or remove state dependencies.
The type analyzer provides an over-approximation ac-
cording to the principles described in Section 3. The analy-
sis result shows the set of traced values and the set of values,
which are potentially influenced by them.
There are several ways to use the analyzer. First, a value
can be marked and its influence and usage can be deter-
mined. This feature can be used to prevent private data from
illegal usage and theft. Second, the traceℓ function may be
used to encapsulate foreign code. As a result of this encapsu-
lation each value which is modified due to the foreign code
is highlighted by the analysis. An inspection of the results
can show breaches of integrity.
Our implementation is based on an early version of TAJS.
The current TAJS version includes support for further lan-
guage features including eval [16]. The dependency analy-
sis can benefit from these extensions by merging it into the
current development branch of TAJS.
9.1 Runtime Evaluation
We evaluated the performance impact of our extension by
analyzing programs from the Google V8 Benchmark Suite4.
The programs we selected range from about 400 to 5000
lines of code and perform tasks like an OS kernel simulation,
constraint solving, or extraction of regular expressions. The
tests were run on a MacBook Pro with 2 GHz Intel Core i7
processor with 8 GB memory.
Figure 17 shows the particular benchmarks together with
the averaged time (in milliseconds) to run the analysis and to
print the output. The TAJS column shows the timing of the
original type analyzer without dependency extension. The
TbDA column shows the timing of our extended version.
The figures demonstrate that the dependency analysis leads
to a slowdown between 12% and 106%. Two further bench-
marks (RayTrace and EarleyBoyer) did not run to comple-
tion because of compatibility problems caused by the out-
dated version of TAJS underlying our implementation.
4 http://v8.googlecode.com/svn/data/benchmarks/v7/run.html
10. Related Work
Information flow analysis was pioneered by Denning’s work
[8, 9] which models different security levels as values in a
lattice containing elements like High and Low and which
suggests an analysis as an abstract interpretation of the prop-
agation of these levels through the program. Zanioli and oth-
ers [24] present a recent example of such an analysis with an
emphasis on constructing an expressive analysis domain.
Many authors have taken up this approach and transposed
it to type theoretic and logical settings [1, 3, 13, 21, 23].
In these systems, input value types are enhanced with se-
curity levels. Well-typed programs guarantee that no High
value flows into a Low output and thus noninterference be-
tween high inputs and low outputs [10]. Similar to the sound-
ness property of our dependency analysis changes on High
inputs are unobservable in Low outputs. Dependencies are
related to security types, but more flexible [2]. They can be
analyzed before committing to a fixed security lattice.
Security aspects of JavaScript programs have received
much attention. Different approaches focus on static or dy-
namic analysis techniques, e.g. [6, 12, 17], or attempt to
make guarantees by reducing the functionality [20]. The
analysis for dependencies is no security analysis per se, but
the analysis results express information that is relevant for
confidentiality and integrity concerns.
Dependency analysis can be seen as the static counterpart
to data tainting (e.g., [7]). Tainting relies on augmenting the
run-time representation of a value with information about
its properties (like its confidentiality level). Users of the
value first check at run time if that use is granted according
to some security policy. Dynamic tainting approaches have
been successfully used to address security attacks, including
buffer overruns, format string attacks, SQL and command
injections, and cross-site scripting. Tainting semantics are
also used for automatic sanitizer placement [5, 19]. There
are also uses in program understanding, software testing,
and debugging. Tainting can also be augmented with static
analysis to increase its effectiveness [22].
Dynamic languages like JavaScript have many peculiari-
ties that make program analysis and the interpretation of its
results challenging [4]. TAJS [15] and hence our analysis
can handle almost all dynamic features of JavaScript.
11. Conclusion
We have designed a type-based dependency analysis for
JavaScript, proved its soundness and termination, and demon-
strated that independence ensures noninterference. We have
implemented the analysis as an extension of the open-source
JavaScript analyzer TAJS. This approach ensures that our
analysis can be applied to real-world JavaScript programs.
While a dependency analysis is not a security analysis,
it can form the basis for investigating noninterference. This
way, its results can be used to ensure confidentiality and
integrity, as well as verify the correct placement of sanitizers.
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A. Context Dependency
Proof of Lemma 1. H, ρ, κ ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | ve : κe im-
plies that κ ⊆ κe. By induction on the derivation of
H, ρ, κ ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | ve : κe.
Case (DT-CONST): e ≡ c; ve ≡ c; κe ≡ κ. Claim holds
because κ ⊆ κ.
Case (DT-VAR): e ≡ x; ve ≡ v; κe ≡ κv • κ | v : κv =
ρ(x). Claim holds because κ ⊆ κv • κ.
Case (DT-OP): e ≡ op(e0, e1); ve ≡ vop; κe ≡ κ0 • κ1.
By inversion
H, ρ, κ ⊢ e0 ⇓ H
′ | v0 : κ0 (13)
H′, ρ, κ ⊢ e1 ⇓ H
′′ | v1 : κ1 (14)
holds. Induction yields κ ⊆ κ0 and κ ⊆ κ1. Claim holds
because κ ⊆ κe = κ0 • κ1.
Case (DT-ABS): e ≡ λℓx.e; ve ≡ ξℓ; κe ≡ κ. Claim holds
because κ ⊆ κ.
Case (DT-NEW): e ≡ newℓ ep; ve ≡ ξℓ; κe ≡ κv . By
inversion
H, ρ, κ ⊢ ep ⇓ H
′ | v : κv (15)
holds. Induction yields κ ⊆ κv. Claim holds because
κ ⊆ κv .
Case (DT-APP): e ≡ e0(e1); ve ≡ v; κe ≡ κv . By
inversion
H′′, ρ˙[x 7→ v1 : κ1], κ • κ0 ⊢ e˙ ⇓ H
′′′ | v : κv (16)
holds where ρ˙, e˙ is the closure obtained from evaluating
e0. It follows that κ ⊆ κ • κ0 ⊆ κv .
Case (DT-GET): e ≡ e0[e1]; ve ≡ v; κe ≡ κv • κξℓ •
κstr | v : κv = H′′(ξℓ)(str). By inversion
H, ρ, κ ⊢ e0 ⇓ H
′ | ξℓ : κξℓ (17)
H′, ρ, κ ⊢ e1 ⇓ H
′′ | str : κstr (18)
holds. Induction yields κ ⊆ κξℓ and κ ⊆ κstr. Claim
holds because κ ⊆ κv • κξℓ • κstr.
Case (DT-PUT): e ≡ e0[e1] = e2; ve ≡ v; κe ≡ κv. By
inversion
H′′, ρ, κ ⊢ e2 ⇓ H
′′′ | v : κv (19)
holds. Induction yields κ ⊆ κv. Claim holds because
κ ⊆ κv .
Case (DT-IFTRUE): e ≡ if (e0) e1, e2; ve ≡ v1; κe ≡ κ1.
By inversion
H′, ρ, κ • κ0 ⊢ e1 ⇓ H
′′
1 | v1 : κ1 (20)
holds. It follows that κ ⊆ κ • κ0 ⊆ κ1
Case (DT-IFFALSE): Analogous to case
(DT-IFTRUE).
Case (DT-TRACE): e ≡ traceℓ (e′); ve ≡ v; κe ≡ κv. By
inversion
H, ρ, κ • ℓ ⊢ e′ ⇓ H′ | v : κv (21)
holds. It follows that κ ⊆ κ • ℓ ⊆ κv
B. Noninterference
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose H, ρ, κ ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | v : κv . If
ℓ /∈ κ¯ andH ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} H˜ and ρ ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} ρ˜ then H˜, ρ˜, κ ⊢
e¯ ⇓ H˜′ | v˜ : κ˜v with e¯ = e[ℓ 7→ e˜] and e ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} e¯ and
H′ ≡♭′,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} H˜
′ and v : κv ≡♭′,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} v˜ : κ˜v, for some ♭′
extending ♭.
Proof by induction on the derivation ofH, ρ, κ ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | v :
κ and H˜, ρ˜, κ ⊢ e¯ ⇓ H˜′ | v˜ : κ˜v.
Case (DT-CONST): e ≡ c. By definition (6) claim holds
because: c = c → c : κ ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} c : κ
Case (DT-VAR): e ≡ x. ∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ yields
Subcase ℓ /∈ κ: By definition (6), (7) claim holds be-
cause: ρ ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} ρ˜ → ρ(x)•κ ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} ρ˜(x)•κ
Subcase ℓ ∈ κ: From definition (6), (7) claim holds
because: ℓ ∈ κ → ρ(x) • κ ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} ρ˜(x) • κ
Case (DT-OP): e ≡ op(e0, e1). By inversion
∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ : H˜, ρ˜, κ ⊢ e0[ℓ 7→ e˜] ⇓ H˜
′ | v˜0 : κ˜0 (22)
∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ : H˜′, ρ˜, κ ⊢ e1[ℓ 7→ e˜] ⇓ H˜
′′ | v˜1 : κ˜1 (23)
holds. ∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ yields
Subcase ℓ /∈ κ0 ∧ ℓ /∈ κ˜0 ∧ ℓ /∈ κ1 ∧ ℓ /∈ κ˜1: By
definition (6) we obtain
ℓ /∈ κ0 ∧ ℓ /∈ κ˜0 → v0 = v˜0 (24)
ℓ /∈ κ1 ∧ ℓ /∈ κ˜1 → v1 = v˜1 (25)
and this leads to:
⇓vop (v0, v1) • κ0 • κ1 ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯}
⇓vop (v˜0, v˜1) • κ˜0 • κ˜1
(26)
Subcase ℓ ∈ κ0 ∨ ℓ ∈ κ˜0 ∨ ℓ ∈ κ1 ∨ ℓ ∈ κ˜1: Again
by (6)
⇓vop (v0, v1) • κ0 • κ1 ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯}
⇓vop (v˜0, v˜1) • κ˜0 • κ˜1
(27)
holds.
Claim holds because ⇓vop (v0, v1) •κ0 •κ1 ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯}⇓vop
(v˜0, v˜1) • κ˜0 • κ˜1.
Case (DT-ABS): e ≡ λℓx.e where location ξℓ with ξℓ /∈
dom(H) and location ξ˜ℓ with ξ˜ℓ /∈ dom(H˜) extends
the renaming ♭ with ♭′ = ♭[ξℓ 7→ ξ˜ℓ]. By definition (6)
ξℓ : κ ≡♭′,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} ξ˜ℓ : κ holds. Claim holds because:
H[ξℓ 7→ 〈ρ, λℓx.e〉] ≡♭′,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} H˜[ξ˜ℓ 7→ 〈ρ˜, λ
ℓx.e˜〉]
(28)
Case (DT-NEW): e ≡ newℓ ep where location ξℓ with ξℓ /∈
dom(H) and location ξ˜ℓ with ξ˜ℓ /∈ dom(H˜) extends
the renaming ♭ with ♭′ = ♭[ξℓ 7→ ξ˜ℓ]. By definition (6)
ξℓ : κ ≡♭′,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} ξ˜ℓ : κ holds. By inversion
∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ : H˜, ρ˜, κ ⊢ ep[ℓ 7→ e˜] ⇓ H˜
′ | v˜ : κ˜v (29)
holds. Claim holds because:
H′[ξℓ 7→ v] ≡♭′,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} H˜
′[ξ˜ℓ 7→ v˜] (30)
Case (DT-APP): e ≡ e0(e1). By inversion
∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ : H˜, ρ˜, κ ⊢ e0[ℓ 7→ e˜] ⇓ H˜
′ | ξ˜ℓ : κ˜0 (31)
∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ : H˜′, ρ˜, κ ⊢ e1[ℓ 7→ e˜] ⇓ H˜
′′ | v˜1 : κ˜1 (32)
holds. ∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ yields
Subcase ℓ /∈ κ0 ∧ ℓ /∈ κ˜0: By definition (6) we obtain
ℓ /∈ κ0 ∧ ℓ /∈ κ˜0 → ♭(ξ
ℓ) = ξ˜ℓ (33)
and this leads by definition (9), (10) to:
〈ρ˙, λℓx.e˙〉 = H(ξℓ) ∧ 〈ρ¨, λℓx.e¨〉 = H˜(ξ˜ℓ)
→ ρ˙ ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} ρ¨ ∧ λ
ℓx.e˙ ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} λ
ℓx.e¨
(34)
Hence, ρ˙[x 7→ v1 : κ1] ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} ρ¨[x 7→ v˜1 : κ˜1] and
e˙ ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} e¨ → e˙ ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} e¨[ℓ 7→ e˜] complies
the postcondition to apply the induction where
∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ : H˜′′, ρ¨[x 7→ v˜1 : κ˜1], κ ⊢
e¨[ℓ 7→ e˜] ⇓ H˜′′ | v˜ : κ˜v
(35)
Subcase ℓ ∈ κ0 ∨ ℓ ∈ κ˜0: By lemma (1) applied on
κ • κ0 ⊆ κv and κ • κ˜0 ⊆ κ˜v the claim holds
because:
v : κv ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} v˜ : κ˜v (36)
H′′′ ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} H˜
′′′ (37)
Case (DT-GET): e ≡ e0[e1]. By inversion
∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ : H˜, ρ˜, κ ⊢ e0[ℓ 7→ e˜] ⇓ H˜
′ | ξ˜ℓ : κ˜ξℓ (38)
∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ : H˜′, ρ˜, κ ⊢ e1[ℓ 7→ e˜] ⇓ H˜
′′ | s˜tr : κ˜str (39)
hold.
Subcase ℓ /∈ κξℓ ∧ ℓ /∈ κ˜ξℓ ∧ ℓ /∈ κstr ∧ ℓ /∈ κ˜str: By
definition (6) we obtain
ℓ /∈ κξℓ ∧ ℓ /∈ κ˜ξℓ → ♭(ξ
ℓ) = ξ˜ℓ (40)
ℓ /∈ κstr ∧ ℓ /∈ κ˜str → str = s˜tr (41)
which follows that
H′′(ξℓ)(str) • κξℓ • κstr ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯}
H˜′′(ξ˜ℓ)(s˜tr) • κ˜ξℓ • κ˜str
(42)
Subcase ℓ ∈ κξℓ ∨ ℓ ∈ κ˜ξℓ ∨ ℓ ∈ κstr ∨ ℓ ∈ κ˜str: By
definition (6) we obtain
H′′(ξℓ)(str) • κξℓ • κstr ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯}
H˜′′(ξ˜ℓ)(s˜tr) • κ˜ξℓ • κ˜str
(43)
Claim holds because H′′(ξℓ)(str) • κξℓ • κstr ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯}
H˜′′(ξ˜ℓ)(s˜tr) • κ˜ξℓ • κ˜str.
Case (DT-PUT): e ≡ e0[e1] = e2. By inversion
∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ : H˜, ρ˜, κ ⊢ e0[ℓ 7→ e˜] ⇓ H˜
′ | ξ˜ℓ : κ˜ξℓ (44)
∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ : H˜′, ρ˜, κ ⊢ e1[ℓ 7→ e˜] ⇓ H˜
′′ | s˜tr : κ˜str (45)
∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ : H˜′′, ρ˜, κ ⊢ e2[ℓ 7→ e˜] ⇓ H˜
′′′ | v˜ : κ˜v (46)
holds. ∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ yields
Subcase ℓ /∈ κξℓ ∧ ℓ /∈ κ˜ξℓ ∧ ℓ /∈ κstr ∧ ℓ /∈ κ˜str ∧ ℓ /∈
κv ∧ ℓ /∈ κ˜v. By definition (6), (10) we obtain
ℓ /∈ κξℓ ∧ ℓ /∈ κ˜ξℓ → ♭(ξ
ℓ) = ξ˜ℓ (47)
ℓ /∈ κstr ∧ ℓ /∈ κ˜str → str = s˜tr (48)
ℓ /∈ κv ∧ ℓ /∈ κ˜v → v = v˜ (49)
and this leads to:
H′′′[ξℓ, str 7→ v : κv • κξℓ • κstr] ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯}
H˜′′′[ξ˜ℓ, s˜tr 7→ v˜ : κ˜v • κ˜ξℓ • κ˜str]
(50)
Subcase ℓ ∈ κξℓ ∨ ℓ ∈ κ˜ξℓ ∨ ℓ ∈ κstr ∨ ℓ ∈ κ˜str ∨ ℓ ∈
κv ∨ ℓ ∈ κ˜v. By definition (6), (10)
H′′′[ξℓ, str 7→ v : κv • κξℓ • κstr] ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯}
H˜′′′[ξ˜ℓ, s˜tr 7→ v˜ : κ˜v • κ˜ξℓ • κ˜str]
(51)
holds.
Claim holds because H′′′[ξℓ, str 7→ v : κv • κξℓ •
κstr] ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} H˜
′′′[ξ˜ℓ, s˜tr 7→ v˜ : κ˜v • κ˜ξℓ • κ˜str].
Case (DT-IFTRUE): e ≡ if (e0) e1, e2. By inversion
∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ : H˜, ρ˜, κ ⊢ e0[ℓ 7→ e˜] ⇓ H˜
′ | v˜0 : κ˜0 (52)
∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ : H˜′, ρ˜, κ • κ˜0 ⊢
e1[ℓ 7→ e˜] ⇓ H˜
′′
1 | v˜1 : κ˜1
(53)
holds. ∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ yields
Subcase ℓ /∈ κ0 ∧ ℓ /∈ κ˜0: By definition (6) we obtain
ℓ /∈ κ0 ∧ ℓ /∈ κ˜0 → v0 = v˜0 (54)
Claim holds by inversion of (DT-IFTRUE).
Subcase ℓ ∈ κv ∨ ℓ ∈ v˜0: By lemma (1) applied on
κ • κ0 ⊆ κ1 and κ • κ˜0 ⊆ κ˜1 the claim holds
because:
v1 : κ1 ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} v˜1 : κ˜1 (55)
H′′1 ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} H˜
′′
1 (56)
Case (DT-IFFALSE): Analogous to case
(DT-IFTRUE).
Case (DT-TRACE): e ≡ traceℓ (e). By inversion
∀ℓ′ /∈ κ¯ : H˜, ρ˜, κ • ℓ ⊢ eℓ[ℓ 7→ e˜] ⇓ H˜
′ | v˜ : κ˜v (57)
holds. ∀ℓ /∈ κ¯ yields
Subcase ℓ′ 6= ℓ: Claim holds by inversion (DT-TRACE).
Subcase ℓ′ = ℓ: By definition (1) we obtain:
∀ℓ′ /∈ κ¯ : H˜, ρ˜, κ • ℓ ⊢ e˜ ⇓ H˜′′ | v˜′ : κ˜′v (58)
By lemma (1) applied on κ • ℓ ⊆ κ˜′v the claim holds
because:
ℓ ∈ κ˜′v → v : κv ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} v˜
′ : κ˜′v (59)
ℓ ∈ κ˜′v → H
′ ≡♭,{ℓ|ℓ/∈κ¯} H˜
′′ (60)
C. Correctness
First, we state some auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 6 (Subset consistency on states). H ≺C Γ0 implies
H ≺C Γ0 ⊔ Γ1 with Γ0 ⊑ Γ0 ⊔ Γ1.
Proof of Lemma 6. By definition (11).
Lemma 7 (Subset consistency on values). ω ≺C ϑ0 implies
ω ≺C ϑ0 ⊔ ϑ1 with ϑ0 ⊑ ϑ0 ⊔ ϑ1.
Proof of Lemma 7. By definition (11).
Lemma 8 (Consistency on dependencies). v : κv ≺C
ϑ ∧ κ ≺C D implies v : κv • κ ≺C 〈Lϑ,Ξϑ,Dϑ ⊔ D〉
Proof of Lemma 8. By definition (11).
Lemma 9 (Property Update). ∀s, θ,L, ϑ | s ≺C θ implies
s ≺C θ[L 7→ θ(L) ⊔ ϑ]
Proof of Lemma 9. By definition (11).
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that H, ρ, κ ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | v
then ∀Γ, σ with H ≺C Γ, ρ ≺C σ and κ ≺C DΓ:
Γ, σ ⊢ e ⇓ Γ′ | ϑ with H′ ≺C Γ′ and v ≺C ϑ. Proof
by induction on the derivation ofH, ρ, κ ⊢ e ⇓ H′ | ω and
Γ, σ ⊢ e ⇓ Γ′ | ϑ.
Case (DT-CONST): e ≡ c. Claim holds because c : κ ≺C
〈c, ∅,DΓ〉.
Case (DT-VAR): e ≡ x. Claim holds because ρ ≺C σ
implies ρ(x) • κ ≺C σ(x) ⊔ DΓ.
Case (DT-OP): e ≡ op(e0, e1) where by inversion
Γ, σ ⊢ e0 ⇓ Γ
′ | ϑ0 (61)
Γ′, σ ⊢ e1 ⇓ Γ
′′ | ϑ1 (62)
holds. Claim holds by definition (4).
Case (DT-ABS): e ≡ λℓx.e. Claim holds by definition (11).
Case (DT-NEW): e ≡ newℓ ep where by inversion
Γ, σ ⊢ ep ⇓ Γ
′ | ϑ (63)
holds. Claim holds by definition (11).
Case (DT-APP): e ≡ e0(e1) where by inversion
Γ, σ ⊢ e0 ⇓ Γ
′ | 〈L0,Ξ0,D0〉 (64)
Γ′, σ ⊢ e1 ⇓ Γ
′′ | ϑ1 (65)
holds. By definition (11) we obtain ∃ℓ ∈ Ξ0 | ξℓ ≺C ℓ.
Subcase ∀ℓ ∈ Ξ0 : ξℓ ≺C ℓ where by inversion
Γ′′[D 7→ DΓ′′ ⊔ D0], σ˙[x 7→ ϑ1] ⊢
e ⇓ Γ′′′ | ϑ
(66)
holds.
Subsubcase 〈Γ′′[D 7→ DΓ′′ ⊔ D0], ϑ1〉 ⊑ F(ℓ)In.
Claim holds by lemma (6) and (2).
Subsubcase 〈Γ′′[D 7→ DΓ′′ ⊔ D0], ϑ1〉 6⊑ F(ℓ)In.
Claim holds by lemma (6) and (7).
Subcase ∀ℓ ∈ Ξ0 : ξℓ 6≺C ℓ Case holds by ∃ℓ ∈
Ξ0 | ξℓ ≺C ℓ and lemma (6) and (7).
Case (DT-GET): e ≡ e0[e1] where by inversion
Γ, σ ⊢ e0 ⇓ Γ
′ | 〈L0,Ξ0,D0〉 (67)
Γ′, σ ⊢ e1 ⇓ Γ
′′ | 〈str,Ξ1,D1〉 (68)
holds. Claim holds because lemma (4) and definition (11)
implies H′′(ξℓ)(str) ≺C ϑ.
Case (DT-PUT): e ≡ e0[e1] = e2 where by inversion
Γ, σ ⊢ e0 ⇓ Γ
′ | 〈L0,Ξ0,D0〉 (69)
Γ′, σ ⊢ e1 ⇓ Γ
′′ | 〈str,Ξ1,D1〉 (70)
Γ′′, σ ⊢ e2 ⇓ Γ
′′′ | ϑ (71)
holds. Claim holds because lemma (5) and definition (11)
implies H′′′(ξℓ)[str 7→ v : κv] ≺C Γ′′′′.
Case (DT-IFTRUE): e ≡ if (e0) e1, e2 where by inversion
Γ, σ ⊢ e0 ⇓ Γ
′ | 〈L0,Ξ0,D0〉 (72)
Γ′[D 7→ DΓ ⊔ D0], σ ⊢ e1 ⇓ Γ
′′
1 | ϑ1 (73)
holds. By definition (11) we obtain true ≺C L0.
Subcase L0 = true. Claim holds by inversion.
Subcase L0 = bool. Claim holds by lemma (6) and (7).
Case (DT-IFFALSE): Analogous to case
(DT-IFTRUE).
Case (DT-TRACE): e ≡ traceℓ (e) where by inversion
Γ[D 7→ DΓ ⊔ ℓ], σ ⊢ e ⇓ Γ
′ | ϑ (74)
holds. Claim holds by definition (11).
D. Termination
Lemma 10 (Monotonicity). The inference system in Fig. 10
is monotone.
Proof of Lemma 10. We have to show monotonicity, that is,
∀Γ, Γ˜, σ, σ˜, ϑ, ϑ˜, e with Γ ⊑ Γ˜, σ ⊑ σ˜:
Γ, σ ⊢ e ⇓ Γ′ | ϑ ∧ Γ˜, σ˜ ⊢ e ⇓ Γ˜′ | ϑ˜
→ Γ′ ⊑ Γ˜′ ∧ ϑ ⊑ ϑ˜
(75)
The proof is by induction on Γ, σ ⊢ e ⇓ Γ′ | ϑ. It is easy
to see that each rule preserves monotonicity if the recursive
uses of the judgment do so, too.
Lemma 11 (Ascending Chain Condition). For each subject
program, the analysis reaches a finite subset of the partially
ordered set (Analysis Lattice,⊑).
Proof sketch of Lemma 11. Inspection of Fig. 8 shows that
the finiteness of many components of the abstract semantic
domain depend on the finiteness of the number of labels
ℓ in a program. The sole exception is the abstract object,
which is a mapping from lattice values to abstract values.
Because the String sublattice of Lattice Value has infinitely
many values, the domain of abstract objects is infinite and
has infinite height.
We argue that each abstract object only uses a finite num-
ber of its fields by looking at the possible arguments to get
and put properties. Non-⊤ values of String are generated by
constants in the program and by primitive operations applied
to constants. Disregarding recursion, there are only finitely
many such constants and operations, so that only a finite sub-
lattice of Abstract Object is exercised.
Adding recursion does not change this picture because
the function store subsumes function calls. If a call to a
function has a fixed string argument that is different to the
argument of previous calls, then the analysis subsumes these
arguments to ⊤ and analyzes the function body with the
subsumed argument.
Proof of Theorem 3. For each Γ, σ, and e, there exist Γ′
and ϑ such that Γ, σ ⊢ e ⇓ Γ′ | ϑ. The computation
terminates with a fixpoint because all inference rules are
monotone (Lemma 10) and the analysis lattice has finite
height (Lemma 11).
